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Abstract
Research Question Can criminal recruiters be identified and ranked by crime harm
levels in a London borough, and if so, how long is the predictive window of oppor-
tunity for targeting them with crime prevention efforts?
Data This study deploys 5 years of Metropolitan Police Service crime data, relating to
one of the 32 London boroughs in that time period. The data structure allowed
identification of all suspects linked to the same crime report and all crime reports
linked to the same suspects. Identification of linked suspects and their associated crime
harm was undertaken using Structured Query Language (SQL) and ColdFusion Mark-
up Language (CFML) via a web-based application.
Methods All offenders were ranked by the number of co-offenders they acquired, as well as
the total Cambridge crime harm index weight of the detected offences associated with them.
Findings The highest harm recruiters are shown to be up to 137 times as harmful as the
average offender, with one recruiter committing the same number of crimes as another
but having 97 times more crime harm. Recruiter populations are highly dynamic, with
few potential targets persisting from year to year over multiple years.
Conclusions This study suggests that criminal recruiters are readily identifiable from
police data, but police would only have a short window of opportunity to use deterrent
or other preventive strategies with them once they are identified.
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Introduction
Targeting police resources can be achieved through a number of methods, using
different units of analysis. Places, victims and offenders are the most prominent units,
yet they may each feature different challenges for operational police purposes. One
central challenge is to understand the causal links across crimes and criminals,
especially in terms of the networks of co-offending that are detectable in police data.
Such efforts can take police targeting strategies beyond the atomized individual
offender and embed them in the relationships across offenders. This is especially
important for offenders with high risk of causing high harm (Sherman et al. 2016). It
is even more important for offenders who may recruit other offenders to enter a life of
crime for their first criminal act, or to enlist them in repeated co-offending activity
(Sarnecki 2001).
Interventions with high-risk offenders, in general, can be accomplished by a number
of tactics, including Integrated Offender Management, Restorative Justice Conferences
and more traditional “Prolific Priority Offender” programmes within police agencies.
These tactics may disrupt and deter offenders through myriad police actions, including
bail/curfew checks, warrant execution, GPS tagging and targeted stop and search. Yet
the value of these activities in reducing crime harm may depend entirely on the capacity
of targeting strategies to distinguish the offenders causing highest harm from the
majority whose sum total of crime causes less harm than a potentially predictable
highest harm “felonious few” (Sherman 2019).
This study examines a method of targeting offenders based on their relationship
with other known offenders, as established based crime reports data. While this
method has been used in California (Englefield and Ariel 2017), Sweden
(Sarnecki 2001) and other countries, the present study appears to be the first to
examine the method in London. The method identifies a small subset of prolific
offenders who seem to recruit others into crime, as indicated by a higher than
average number of co-offenders (each set defined as two or more persons
appearing in the crime report in relation to the same offence) within a population
of known offenders. Rather than identifying “prolific” offenders based solely on
the number of crimes linked to them, this method starts with the number of co-
offenders linked to each offender (Reiss 1988; Sarnecki 2001).
With the advent of the Cambridge crime harm index (Sherman 2007a, b;
Sherman et al. 2016), targeting by identifying high levels of co-offending can
now be refined by calculating CHI totals for each offender. Crimes linked to those
recruiters and their recruits can be examined in terms of harm, rather than
computing crime counts for each offender or network as if all crimes are created
equal. As far as we are aware, no previous analysis has calculated the CHI values
for co-offenders, their networks, or (crucially) the key “recruiters” into those
networks. The enhancement of targeting that this study provides by applying
CHI scores builds on the previous work done without calculating harm severity
(including van Mastrigt and Farrington 2011; Sarnecki 2001; Englefield and Ariel
2017), with identification of the recruiters suggesting that targeting them will be
an effective use of police resources (Ariel et al. 2019). Yet that conclusion may
rest more on measures of harm than on measures of frequency, when both are
distributed across populations of previously identified suspects.
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This study examines the extent to which the application of a crime harm weighting
to those identified recruiters can enhance the potential benefit of targeting police action,
when it is designed to disrupt and deter these individuals both from committing crime
themselves and from recruiting others into crime. It does that by using CHI to create a
more sensitive measure of the different levels of harm associated with different
recruiters and networks.
Targeting recruiters based on crime harm is still based on the assumption that those
recruits who offend with the recruiters would not have started offending to the same
extent unless they had been mentored into committing crime by the recruiter. Targeting
these recruiters thus multiplies crime reductions, while targeting recruiters for crime
harm can thus multiply harm reductions: in both cases the reduction in direct as well as
vicarious harm attributable to them and their recruiting of others into crime. The
analysis will examine how the rank ordering of these high harm offenders is altered
by consideration of the crime harm attributable to them rather than just their crime
counts, demonstrating that the high crime count recruiters are not the same as the high
crime harm recruiters.
This study will look at two broad methods of identifying recruiters—through
analysis of 5 years of data on each offender and their crimes on a calendar year basis,
year by year. The first approach is that taken by previous authors (van Mastrigt and
Farrington 2011; Englefield and Ariel 2017). The year-on-year analysis will seek to
demonstrate whether targeting those recruiters would actually reduce harm in the
ensuing years, by asking to what extent the recruiters identified continue to commit
crime—a simple evaluation of the potential benefit of targeting recruiters over a longer
time period. Yet even if the time period to target high harm recruiters is short, it may
still be worthwhile to focus limited resources on them for short periods of time.
By identifying these exceptionally high harm offenders, the cost-benefit analysis of
policing interventions should be high, allowing police leaders to show evidence of why
they are deploying their officers to disrupt these offenders and not most others. To test this
hypothesis, this study undertook an evaluation approach of the harm prevention potential
of targeting co-offending recruiters, by ascertaining how much crime the recruiters were
linked to in the calendar years subsequent to the year in which they were identified.
Surprisingly, the analysis suggests that the window of opportunity for targeting high
harm crime recruiters is short. While the highest harm members of the “felonious few”
(Sherman 2019) are very harmful in the calendar year in which they are identified, very
few of them show up as high harmers in the subsequent years. Further research should
consider the benefit of identifying recruiters on an ongoing basis, targeting them
immediately once they have reached a threshold of crime harm.
Research Questions
The research procedure for this study was designed as a three-step process of confirming
previous findings, undertaking new analyses of harm and then asking the question of “so
what” for a multi-year period. These questions can be specified as follows:
1. To what extent are “recruiters” of co-offending criminals identifiable in recorded
crime datasets in this London borough?
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2. What are the levels of crime and crime harm associated with recruiters, relative to
other offenders and each other?
3. What is the feasibility of targeting recruiters over a multi-year period?
Data
The identification of co-offenders based on official records requires access to informa-
tion about who is offending and with whom. This question could be answered by
various datasets, with varying degrees of accuracy and usefulness.
Court Records
Perhaps the most reliable method would be to analyse court records for offenders found
guilty of offences committed together. This method would identify co-offenders with a
high degree of accuracy, given the evidentiary standard of “beyond all reasonable
doubt” applied to criminal proceedings. The downsides to analysing court data,
however, include the small number of criminal associations actually leading to prose-
cution and the difficulties associated with locating records.
Arrest Data
Previous attempts to identify police recruiters often used arrest data to identify recruiter-
recruit relationships (see review in van Mastrigt and Carrington 2019). A dataset on co-
arrests (i.e. individuals that were arrested by the police for the same offence) is the most
approachable to police analysts and the most accurate police dataset prior to charging
co-offenders for the same offence (on studies looking at co-offending data using charge
records, see Frydensberg et al. 2019).
The most stubborn issue with using arrest data to identify co-offending relationships
is understanding recruitment. Differentiating between crimes committed by a pair
(or more) of offenders and crimes committed by offenders who have a recruiter-
recruit relationship is not straightforward: the type of relationship is not evidentiary
per se and therefore goes unrecorded in police data. Instead, research with police data
applied a series of assumptions that, when met, increase the likelihood about recruit-
ment relationships: when the recruiter is older and more prolific than the inexperienced
and young co-offender (e.g. van Mastrigt and Farrington 2011). The construct validity
of this approach is not unfounded, as it corresponds to recruitment patterns found in
research using non-police records. For example, based on interviews with offenders in
prison, Morselli et al. (2006, p. 27) reported that “on average, mentors were 11.4 years
older than the protégés”.
Moreover, arrest data alone are insufficient when the geographic location in which
the study takes place is small (so the total number of arrests is proportionally low).
Recruiter-recruit relationships are rare (van Mastrigt and Farrington 2011) and arrest
data from one police borough will produce a short target list.
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Intelligence Records
At a far lower level of accuracy, but with greater value for policing, it would be
possible to analyse intelligence records. One option is to analyse reports containing
information about “sightings” of known offenders. These data could support conclu-
sions about which people known offenders are associating with. However, non-
offenders may be interacting socially with offenders (or organized crime group of-
fenders interacting with offenders who are not associated with the group), but do not
commit crimes together. These are weak intelligence products with which to ascertain
social network linkages (Denley and Ariel 2019).
A more accurate intelligence data source could be stop and search data, identifying
who has been searched while in the company of others. Since a stop and search requires
reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offence, these data can more precisely
identify offender networks—possibly even more with the advents of body-worn
cameras with facial recognition technologies (Almadan et al. 2020; Bromberg et al.
2020). The benefits of these large datasets are their size and the potential to locate latent
relationships that arrest and court records do not show.
For this study, we built the network of co-offenders based on crime reports. These
form part of the overall intelligence records as “products” of policing activities: they
often contain names of accomplices that are discovered through investigation activities.
For example, an offender may name his co-offenders in a police interview, or a person
who identifies the two individuals that victimized him.
This study therefore examines co-offenders in the context of these crime reports,
using all identified suspects, whether they are charged or not. The term “co-offender”
could be replaced, in strictly legal terms, with a “co-identified suspect”. The results of
this analysis should therefore considered to be an intelligence product for use by police
agencies as a targeting method, rather than a way of definitively stating that those
identified are responsible for the crimes which they are linked to.
Procedure
The study is based on more specific (and harm-coded) facts in the Met Police crime
recording system, known as CRIS (Criminal Records Information System). CRIS
records all allegations of crime as well as information about the suspects linked to
each criminal offence. The suspect information in CRIS can range from a scant
description up to a formally identified offender. The scant descriptions are inputted to
the system when a victim can give no further details—perhaps having being attacked
from behind, for example, and only being able to guess that the offender was taller than
them but nothing else. There will also be several crime reports with no identified
suspect, for example, burglaries where no offender is identified at all.
An export file of all crime data for 5 years for a London borough was obtained from
the CRIS system. Reports are inputted to this system once it has been established by the
police that a crime has been committed and is distinct from the “call for service”
systems.
Where a suspect is identified to the level of detail of having their name and date of
birth recorded, further internal Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) processes take place
to assign a unique identifier to that offender. When a suspect is arrested in the MPS,
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their identity is confirmed against an internal unique ID in addition to any Police
National Computer record. This unique identifier removes any substantial error that
would have been encountered and had suspects been identified only by their name and
date of birth. This MPS-assigned identifier removes the error attributable to misspelling
of names, or incorrect entry of dates of birth. It also accounts for slightly different
names being given at different times (nicknames, extra names, pseudonyms, etc.).
This export file resulted in 80,695 rows of data, with each row containing the unique
suspect identifier, linked crime reference number and date of birth of offender. Suspects
linked to multiple crimes would appear as multiple rows of data, so the number of
crimes described in the data is 68,809.
To identify recruiters, MySQL database was used with the application written in
ColdFusion Markup Language (CFML) and Structured Query Language (SQL). The
data were first anonymised. The data were structured in such a way that one row was
linked to each suspect for each crime, with columns for suspect id, crime reference
number id, date of birth and crime type code. In this manner, for a crime with ten
identified suspects, there would be ten rows of data.
This study, as in previous studies, developed its own algorithm to define the
difference between offenders considered “recruiters” and those not considered to be
recruiters. van Mastrigt and Farrington (2011) and Englefield and Ariel (2017) each
adopted different thresholds to identify recruiters based on official statistics but used the
same three variables (Table 1).
van Mastrigt and Farrington (2011) define an average of 3.33 offences a year as the
threshold for a prolific offender. Since the present (London) study is examining 5 years
of data, the corresponding count would be 16 offences over the 5 years. For ease of
calculation on a year-by-year basis, this study will identify as prolific, any suspect
linked in CRIS reports to a mean of three or more crimes per year.
Next, after identifying suspects linked to a mean of three or more offences per year
over the 5-year dataset, we moved to identifying suspects linked to five or more
accomplices, restricting this to the number of accomplices who were more than 1 year
younger than the candidate for recruiter status by comparing dates of birth of the
candidate to the apparent accomplice. These prolific suspects with a high rate of
younger accomplices were then identified as recruiters.
Identifying Harm
MPS crimes are categorized into a wide variety of classifications, and due to the
historical make-up of the crime recording system, there are multiple codes for the same
Table 1 Decision rules for crime recruiter identification, by two studies
Mastrigt and Farrington Englefield
Time period (in years) 3 8
Number of offences 10 3
Number of co-offenders 5 3
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crimes, as well as redundant crime classifications no longer used. A database of all
crime codes found in the data was compiled and the corresponding crime harm value
was recorded next to each crime classification to allow cross-referencing with the
individual crimes. This allowed the analysis to assign crime harm values to
suspects—for example, a suspect linked to two offences of domestic burglary without
violence and one instance of assaulting a constable would be assigned a crime harm
value of 15 + 15 + 1.5 = 31.5.
In total, 307 crime classifications were assigned crime harm counts. The CHI
scores for each classification were taken from the Cambridge crime harm index
(Weinborn et al. 2017). Although the process of matching those counts against
MPS crime classifications was not straightforward given the significant differ-
ences between the classifications used in the CRIS system, the definitions were all
provided by “starting point” sentence in the sentencing guidelines. In the majority
of cases, this merely required the identification of corresponding classifications
from the abbreviations used.
A number of CRIS classifications relate to “non-crime” classifications where the
system is used to record investigations that do not amount to substantive offences. The
largest category of these is the use of the CRIS system to record details of domestic
arguments where no offences are committed, the so called “Non-Crime Domestic”.
These categories were assigned a “0” value on the crime harm index.
The Cambridge crime harm index can be used to assign harm to individual suspects,
and it allows a calculation to be made of how much harm that offender is suspect is
linked to, as a percentage of all harm present in the data. However, this suggests that an
offence of “domestic burglary without violence” involving five offenders has a crime
harm index of 15 × 5 = 75, whereas a similar offence with only one suspect would have
a crime harm index of only 15. This complexity is not considered when ascertaining the
geographic spread of crime harm, as that data would consider purely crime counts
multiplied by corresponding harm. It is only when considering offenders that this
potential for crimes with multiple offenders to be weighted by the number of offenders
becomes a concern.
This inconsistency is also apparent in the Home Office counting rules that dictate
how UK police agencies record crimes (Home Office 2015). These state, for
example, that where “two relatives of the householder who are staying overnight
have property stolen when the house is burgled, one crime of burglary will be
recorded” (p. 19).
The intention of the CHI is to better ascertain the associated harm of a crime.
It can be argued that two people being subjected to a residential burglary implies
that twice the harm has occurred compared to an offence with only one victim,
since the CHI is by definition, partially an attempt to reflect the impact on the
victim. If there are 5 suspects for that same burglary, how does this change the
harm associated with it? The answer could be said to lie in the perspective being
taken, since an offender-based perspective would identify offences with multiple
suspects giving a greater opportunity to reduce the offending of those suspects.
Since this study is aimed at identifying high harm offenders/suspects, it makes
sense to count two suspects of one crime as amounting to twice the harm. For
consistency, this is the approach taken with the calculations.
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Findings
Five-Year Data Analysis
The 5-year data contained 68,809 crime reports and 51,632 unique suspects with a
valid date of birth. Fully 75% of suspects were only linked with one crime report. Of
the 25% linked to more than one crime report, the number linked to higher numbers of
crimes reduces sharply as a proportion of the 51,632. There is a very steep curve of
repeat suspects, with only 495 (0.96%) committing more than ten offences in the 5-year
period. The most prolific suspect was linked to 65 crime reports—on average more than
one a month for the entire 5-year period. This data also demonstrates that only 5051
(9.8%) of suspects were linked to three or more crimes.
The first element of the recruiter identification is that it must be prolific, which this
study defines prolific as being linked to 15 or more offences in the 5-year period.
Applying those decision rules produced 229 prolific suspects. When comparing the
prolific suspects’ crime breakdown against the general crime type breakdown, there
appears to be one major difference between prolific suspects and the general suspect
population, with prolific offenders committing about twice the amount of theft and
handling offences (35% c/f 16%) as all non-prolific suspect combined and about half
the violence offences as all offenders (18% c/f 35%).
This difference in crime types may reflect the difficulty in securing convictions for
acquisitive offences, or it may demonstrate a difference in offence preference for
recidivist offenders. It may also reflect the sentencing differences between acquisitive
crimes and violent offences, with those offenders linked to a larger number of violent
offences being more likely to receive a custodial sentence or other interventions.
Recruiter Identification
Having identified the prolific suspects, the next process identified those prolific
suspects with more than five co-suspects. This calculation reduced the number of
identified potential recruiters to just 114.
The next stage after this was to select those prolific suspects who were linked to five
or more co-suspects who were younger than them. When initially calculated, this
returned a number of suspects who were linked to a number of their peers and were
identified as being the oldest of a group of similar aged suspects. In particular, this
identified school-age suspects identified as suspects among a large group. This does not
align with the theoretical basis for identifying recruiters (that a more experienced
offender acts as a mentor to a younger offender). A buffer of a year was introduced
to counter this challenge. In line with van Mastrigt and Farrington’s definition, more
than 50% of these co-suspects were required to be more than a year younger than the
recruiter. With this in place, 26 recruiters were identified from the 5-year data matching
the definition:
& Suspects for 15 or more offences (an average of three per year)
& More than 5 co-suspects
& More than 50% of co-suspects being more than a year younger than the recruiter
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Of these recruiters, nine of the 26 were active in every year from 2011 to 2015. Ten
were active in four out of the 5 years, three in 4 years and three in 2 years. There were
no identified recruiters active in only 1 year.
Two identified recruiters had a huge number of co-suspects. Examination of the
relevant crime reports shows that these reports relate to the August 2011 riots in
London. The number of co-suspects is so high because the reports relate to looting of
shops with more than fifty named suspects. As such, this does not match the theoretical
basis of the recruiter, whereby there is social or other exchange between the mentor
recruiter and the recruit. Rather, this appears to be a data anomaly caused by an
extremely unusual series of crimes during the civil unrest.
Crime Harm Linked to Recruiters
With the 26 recruiters identified as above, the harm associated with each can be
calculated by multiplying each of their linked crimes with the crime harm value for
that crime type. The red line shows the offence counts, with suspect 1 having the
highest number of offences.
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates the impact of applying a crime harm index to these
suspects. Recruiters 18 and 19 have the same number of offences linked to them but a
twenty times difference in crime harm. Recruiter 19 would clearly be a more appro-
priate target for police resources, since the amount of harm caused by them is so much
greater.
Of particular note in Fig. 1 is that recruiter 26 is linked to the least number of crimes
(15) yet has the highest attributable crime harm (8220 days). Recruiters 26 and 8 both
match our definition of recruiters yet are linked to crimes with crime harm of 8220 and
84, respectively. This represents a difference of 97 times. Thus using the Cambridge
crime harm index has revealed that targeting recruiter 26 would reduce the harm to
society by 97 more times than recruiter 8, yet a pure crime count analysis would
suggest that recruiter 8 would actually be a more appropriate target.
Fig. 1 Recruiter direct crime harm total by offence count over 5 years
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Expanding the analysis to include the crime counts and crime harm linked to the
recruiter’s co-offenders shows the significant potential benefits of targeting the re-
cruiters. Recruiter 26 is now linked to crime harm amounting to 13,700 days, resulting
from 25 offences, an average of 548 days of crime harm per offence. Recruiter 8 is
linked to 26 offences, more than recruiter 26, but with a total crime harm of 102—an
average of 4 days per offence. The rationale to target recruiter 26 instead of recruiter 8
is clear (Fig. 2).
Total harm present in the dataset is 6,978,508. The top 5 recruiters (0.006% of
suspects) account for 0.84% of all crime harm in Southwark, but only 256 crimes out of
a total of 67,792 (0.38%). These suspects are thus twice as harmful as the crime counts
alone would suggest.
The data analysis so far has focussed on the identification of recruiters in a 5-year
dataset. A core question of this study is how useful the identification of recruiters could
be operationally. While the analysis of 5 years of data undoubtedly identifies high harm
suspects, what is the best way to operationalize this work, in order to target recruiters at
the right time?
In order to understand this, the data was reviewed based on individual and calendar
years of data, to understand the persistence of recruiters in the data. The algorithm used
to identify recruiters was altered to identify a recruiter as a prolific suspect having
committed three or more offences in the year. The requirement for the recruiter to be
linked to five or more younger suspects was not altered.
Table 2 presents the year-on-year data for identified recruiter numbers.
Only twelve recruiters were identified as recruiters in two different years, and no
recruiters were identified in three or more years’ worth of data. As detailed in Table 2
above, a small number of the recruiters identified in the 5-year data were also identified
in any of the individual years, and only five recruiters in the 5-year data were identified
in two different years, and none in three or more.
Fig. 2 Total harm by recruiters and their recruits vs. all offence counts
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The year-on-year data analysis identified varying numbers of recruiters for each
year, with the year 2011 having significantly more recruiters, as a result of the large
number of multiple offender crime reports linked to the August 2011 riots. Because this
year is so affected by those reports, the following analysis is restricted to the 4 years of
2012–2015 which are more typical years.
Summary of Individual Years Data Analysis
From 2012 to 2015, it is clear that a small number of the recruiters are responsible for a
significant percentage of all the crime harm attributable to recruiters and their recruits.
To demonstrate just how concentrated the harm is among a small “felonious few”, the
number of recruiters linked to approximately two thirds of the recruiters’ crime harm
was calculated for each year, reducing the number of recruiters down to the most
harmful. The exact percentage of crime harm attributable to this number was then
calculated. This value is expressed as a percentage of the crime harm in all the crimes
for that year, to show how much of the total harm in the year was attributable to those
high harm recruiters. Table 3 displays the results.
Table 3 suggests that in 2013, just 3 suspects were linked, directly and through their
recruits, to 4.47% of all crime harm committed in a London borough of 300,000
residents. In this year, 9220 offenders were identified for the same policing area, which
suggests that these recruiters are responsible for 137 times as much harm as the average
suspect. This is an extremely powerful demonstration of Sherman’s (2007a, b; 2019)
“felonious few” hypothesis. It suggests that these suspects could be cost-effectively
targeted by any policing agency, as the amount of harm they cause is so very much
more than the average suspect.
Table 2 Recruiters identified per year by consistent decision rules






Table 3 Percentage of total harm attributable to highest harm recruiters








% of all harm by
these recruiters
Times as harmful as
average suspect
2012 4.52 16 4 3.08 72
2013 6.50 20 3 4.47 137
2014 3.39 23 6 2.22 37
2015 3.21 16 3 2.11 67
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Moving Targets: Activity of “Year-on-Year Recruiters in the Following Years
While only twelve of the recruiters are identified as recruiters in more than 1 year, and
none in more than 2 years, the data were analysed to understand whether the recruiters
were linked to any crime at all in the years after they were identified. There is no lower
threshold for the number of crimes committed. This analysis instead simply shows
whether they were linked to any crime reports at all in the following years after initial
identification. Of the 16 recruiters identified in 2012, only 7 were linked to any crime at
all in 2013.
Two-Year Recruiter Identification
To ascertain if recruiters were more active in more than the first following year, the data
was re-computed using 2 years’ worth of data at a time. First, we examine 2012 and
2013 and then 2013 and 2014. For the first pair of years, the presence of those
identified recruiters in the following single years (2014 and 2015) identified recruiters
was ascertained. In addition, the recruiters’ presence in the 5-year recruiters was
identified, and finally, those 2012/2013 recruiters who were linked to any crime in
the following individual years were identified. Of the 21 recruiters identified from
2012/2013 data, only 1 was a recruiter in 2014 and none in 2015.
Three-Year Recruiter Identification
The data from 2012 to 2014 inclusive was analysed to identify recruiters matching the
definition of three offences per year (nine in total) as well as five or more younger co-
suspects. None were identified as recruiters in the 2015 data.
In summary, the 4 years’ worth of data was analysed a year at a time, 2 years at a
time and 3 years at a time. The analysis tried to ascertain any amount of data most
reliably identified recruiters who continued to offend in the ensuing years. The data
above suggests strongly that none of these time periods of analysis usefully identified
recruiters that should be targeted. Instead, it seems sensible for future research to
consider identifying recruiters immediately as soon as they reach a threshold of harm,
rather than on a calendar year basis.
Conclusions
This study has successfully identified recruiters in a London borough according to the
definitions used by previous authors. The subset of prolific offenders that are linked to a
large number of younger co-offenders is identified on a similar scale as in previous
studies and appears to be a fruitful target for police intervention based on this.
The application of the Cambridge crime harm index alters our understanding of
which suspects are high “value” targets considerably. Using CHI rather than crime
counts reveals that some of the identified recruiters account for less crime harm over a
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5-year period than many offenders do in a single crime. This advances the methodology
of high harm offender targeting significantly, suggesting that police resources be
targeted to the highest harm recruiters who are linked to a very significant amount of
harm, making them in some cases up to 137 times as harmful as the average offender.
The recruiters do not appear to be persistent from year to year, either on a 1-, 2- or 3-
year analysis, at least based on recorded offences. There is an argument to be made that
these suspects have been identified as recruiters and therefore are likely to continue
offending even if they are not identified through the data as such. It may also be that
police resources are naturally targeted at these recruiters as they are a subset of prolific
offenders; they may therefore have disappeared from the data due to the application of
the criminal justice process.
The key to targeting recruiters may be to consider a continuous process of identi-
fication, with police interventions focussed on those offenders who reach a threshold,
immediately as soon as they reach that threshold. The justification for such intensive
tracking, perhaps with an algorithmic digital tracking system, is especially justified for
those recruiters who are linked (through accomplices) to substantial amounts of crime
harm. Targeting these high-total (direct and indirect) harm recruiters, as well as their
linked offenders, has clear potential for substantial benefit, as long as they can be
identified early enough.
The requirement to effectively target police resources is central tenet of the drive to
become more evidence-based in policing (Sherman 2013). The identification of re-
cruiters appears to be a promising method of targeting and has previously resisted more
detailed exploration due to the analytic difficulties of identifying recruiters. This has
meant that previous studies have identified recruiters in a dataset but have been unable
to re-compute partial datasets multiple times to ascertain the continuing offending of
those recruits.
This study, having built a database application to accomplish this data analysis, was
able to re-compute the data more than ten times to better understand the potential
impacts of targeting recruiters identified in different time periods. This analysis was
conducted in 2016, and since then, the potential for rapid analysis of large datasets in
this way has improved significantly. The advent of cloud-based platforms where
researchers may purchase large amounts of computing power for short periods of time
has been helpful, as would programming of digital tracking of reported harm levels by
recruiters and their recruits. Revisiting these methods with large datasets may prove
increasingly useful as Police IT systems improve, with work done now potentially
informing operational decision-making as those IT systems advance.
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